Gods and Pascal Wagers

Daniel Garber a philosopher and a historian insisted that science does not refute atheism. He explains that atheism remains an intellectually viable position even as scientific discoveries require believers to abandon their traditional beliefs. Since atheists don’t believe in the existence of God, Daniel Garber argues that people who believe in God always look decent (Garber 187). They always seem smart and thoughtful. He goes ahead and adds that the believers get great comfort from believing in God. But that is not enough reason to convince him to be a believer.

He further states that in the seventeenth century many people were believers, but people took them for granted (Garber 189). He says that theology and religion are a bit complicated and cannot easily be refuted. Daniel Garber states that in past years religion has been challenging. Some of the scientific discoveries such as Aristotle’s discoveries, Darwin’s and that of Newton’s forced religion to adopt some scientific rules.

Daniel Garber says that he is willing to be a believer but only if he is persuaded enough under some conditions. He goes ahead and asks if God exists why he would allow evil into the world. Natural calamities like earthquakes and holocausts could not be happening since God exists.

An argument in philosophy presented by Pascal wager states that human beings bet with their lives whether God exists or not. It states that one has to choose between believing in the existence of God and not believing in his presence (Garber 192). This theory gives an example of how gamblers place their bets. One has to ask him/herself if the results are worth it. Pascal says that if he believes in the existence of God and he happens to exist, then he will enjoy eternal life.  If he believes in God and it happens that God Doesn’t exist then as an atheist one will lose a lot.


Work Cited

Garber, Daniel. “A Historical context” Some Reflections on Bennett and Doing Philosophy Historically.” Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses (2013): 187-194