Introduction

The European Commission is campaigning for a new group of Free Trade Agreements which target the world’s largest economies. The purpose of the new trade agreements is to boost growth and employment capacities for European countries as well as improve the competitiveness of the European markets.[1] As such, the focus has been on bilateral and regional free trade agreements which are regarded as the pivotal drivers of Europe’s economic growth. The benefit, inherently, will be to boost EU’s exterior trade performance as it targets to open new marketplaces for exporters as well as offer a more credible and regulation-based venture environments advantageous to the consumer choice as well as improve on overall organization’s competition with other world organizations.

Despite the campaign to synchronize the improvement of bilateral trade as well as trade agreements, it seems that the conclusion of some of the European significant trading partners such as the United States of America and Japan could jeopardize the efforts to improve on the competitiveness of European countries.[2] Accordingly, the aim of new occupation agreements seeks to conclude with other countries as a means to broaden and cover a broad spectrum of different aspects. Not only do the trade agreements touch on trade tariffs such as customs duties and export subsidies, but it also affects on regulations for services, elimination of some taxes and other related concepts.

The scope of the new generation of free international trade contracts between the European Union and other countries or third-parties needs to be critically examined to initially understand the process and how it is completed. Consequently, the analysis of the legal ramifications that the process poses to both parties should be determined as well. The purpose of the current paper is to delineate on the process and inference of commercial policy treaties between the EU and the third-parties with a closer evaluation of the complications from a legal standpoint to these agreements.[3]

Free Trade Agreements: Initiation of Negotiations  

The onset of negotiation requires the third-party or the European Union’s commission to present a case. The initiation of the talks involves the continuance of approval from the Commission after the European Parliamentary Committee has permitted the parties to progress with deliberations. The approval process is done through a qualified majority voting. Therefore, the permission may be granted as long as the majority vote in favor of the talks; therefore, the twenty-eight members of the EU must not all be in agreement. Moreover, aspects of commerce in health education and cultural services ought to be considered such that policies do not impact the European Union negatively or prejudice the member states.[4] The Commission negotiates for the trade agreements on the European Union’s behalf. During the negotiations, the commission is tasked with the duty of informing the European Parliament of the intentions to start negotiating with the third-party country. Parliament has to approve the trade treatise after which the commission together with the Trade Policy Committee work hand-in-hand to commence or prepare for the trade agreement process and publish the entire outlook of the trade agreements.[5]

Trade Policy Committee

The trade policy committee assists as well as advice the Commission in negotiating agreements with an international organization in areas about commercial policies. Furthermore, the body assists the European Commission on the decision-making process regarding EU trade policy during talks with third-party countries. The committee contains a full member configuration that meets at least once a month or once every six months.[6]

For a country to qualify for entry, a lot of secondary issues are regarded including political stability, economic integrity, member of the Commonwealth, as well as the state ought to be a member of the internationally recognised organizations including the United Nations and its affiliated agencies such as the International Labour Organization. As such, a negotiation directive is provided ought to be obtained from which future meetings or ‘rounds’ are to be held between the representatives of each party in chosen or designated areas. For example, the trade treaty between the United States of America and the European Union commenced in June 2013. Since then, only fifteen rounds of meetings have been held with no substantial account of any agreement on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).[7]

Negotiations for each country are specific and may entail a detailed negotiation between the EU and the third-party. For example, Canada’s trade agreement is ratified under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Nonetheless, there are the basic principles that most bilateral summits have to undergo under the new free trade agreements with the European Union. The trade agreements between the EU and other nations follow a list of principles and regulations so that the process of negotiation and conclusion can be met. The procedure begins with the inception of Rules of Origin. The first stage to any talks is the engagement of Rules of Origin which are integral as well as significant to any part of a trade agreement.[8] As such, it is the leading trade policy where the instruments that are used to table any demands and wants from both parties are done. The process was adopted from the World Trade Organization whose main quest is to phase out tariffs for trading nations to encourage trade and limit barriers. Specific European Union institutions including goods and services, intellectual properties and public procurement among others are tasked with the duty of handling the particular trade agreement provision during the initiation, processing, and conclusion of trade agreements.

1. Goods Trade Agreement: Rules of Origin

Any trade policy often needs diversity in the treatment of foreign good regardless of where they originate to enter the local market. Rules of Origin are the first step to creating a trade agreement between two parties, in this case, the European Union and the third-party states. Rules of Origin are used to measure the economic nationality of goods and their suitability to undergo the trade preference programs.[9] For example, the European Union through the Commission has a set of regulations from which consumable products have to possess a certain standard to enter the domestic market in Europe.[10] Therefore, ‘Rules of Origin’ are there to provide a guideline to beginning the origin of properties that is not only the foundation from where they are distributed but also the place where they are expected to end up. The purpose of the rules is to ensure that the goods admission to a given market ends up reimbursing the envisioned recipient republics or regions, rather than the third-party nations. The principle of reimbursement to the producer is what mainly governs the aspects of trading with the European Union. The underlying prescriptions also ensure that despite the new trade agreements, all the concessionary goods that enter the European market are deemed fit for the consumers in the boundaries.[11] As such, the new trade agreements do not entirely depend on geographical locations to know where the goods came from and thus, producers can channel them from whatever country of choice as long as the state is under trade with the European Union.[12]

Due to the desire to have specific and unique products for consumers in the European Union, the Rules of Origin are an elaborate set of regulations that apply to a non-homogenous and highly differentiated array of products featuring in international trade.[13] Any interested nation should have a list of products that are acceptable to the European Union to qualify for a goods trade agreement.[14]  Therefore, the regulations are often multifaceted and technical such that the Rules of Origin possess a dual challenge. For example, the trade agreement between Japan and the EU has taken more than ten years to be completed.[15] According to the Goods Trade Agreement, Japan’s assessment by the European Union on the Goods Trade Pact has rendered it positively charged and is now welcomed to trade with any European country including Germany which has been interested in the longest time.

Additionally, the process of negotiating under the Rules of Origin dictate that a country that has a non-appearance of the pertinent local production capacity for such contributions would efficiently render convinced locally-produced belongings to be enclosed under the trade treaty. They are deemed unqualified for export to the European countries. The reason is that the rapid integration of the world’s economies has required the European Union to have increased demarcation of designated or defragmented production. Goods, in ordinary cases, undergo specific stages of production in some countries.[16] The industrial configurations including producer-driven as well as buyer-driven should be documented by the interested nations according to the European Union’s Goods Trade Agreement. The requirement to document the process of acquiring raw materials to producing the finished products are, however, not adequately documented in the trades agreement and this may impede the original intent of the Rules of Origin.

1. Elements of Trade Negotiations

In any given trade negotiation, from the Rule of Origin, there are set principles that the third-parties have to be eligible for before any more signatories’ amendments are made. They include origin criteria.[17] Third-parties are required to have to determine the origin and be a preferential market for trade with the European Union to eliminate any convergence with non-reciprocal preference programs that may omit any goods to be traded with EU.[18] The principle, therefore, entails that the products ought to be generated on the whole by the trading country. Consequently, the businesses undertakings of the third-nations have to be investigated in entirety and in part by the subsidiary EU offices in allegiant countries. Any substantial reformation to the products attracts a given charge that is commonly known as minimum value added, change in tariff-heading and specific-process rules.[19]

2. Cumulation

The third step of the negotiation is that the nations should be able, under the European Union’s Rule of Origin principle, determine the trade preferences. Cumulation is a concept that allowed third-parties to use trade partialities accessible to them within the new free trade agreement or one-sided choice. As such, cumulation is defined as the amount to which a third-party’s creation may be exaggerated with other nations without losing its origin status for the intention of the application.[20] For example, if a product that is produced in another country befalls an exporting nation, then the exporting country can take claim of the product. As such, the states have to determine under which category they fall under. They are of two types: bilateral cumulation and diagonal cumulation.

1. Trade and Preference Utilisation: Customs Unions

Bilateral cumulation is where the EU merely provides the inputs to the third-party, which then uses the raw materials to develop the finished product that is then referred back to Europe. The adherence to the protocols is necessary for a country to qualify for a specific trade preference program that has to be indicated. The other is the diagonal cumulation which is defined as the EU’s trade preference program that allows low use of efforts from third-party countries who are not part of the precise new Free Trade Agreement.[21] However, with the new free trade agreement, diagonal cumulation is possible through the following conclusions of the trade contract between the EU and the third-party country. It involves the potential to significantly widen the free trade areas through including countries established within the trade links. For example, the trade arrangements in the ASEAN countries have allowed nations such as Vietnam and Singapore to enter the new skill agreements which in part, were initially enjoyed by Japan and South Korea through the regional cumulation, which affects the diagonal Rules of Origin. [22]

1. Social and Environmental Factors

In the new trade agreements, the European Union has integrated a stronger foothold on the issues of human rights violations and environmental standards. In the First Generation New Free Trade Agreements, third-party nations did not have to undergo stringent measures to interact and trade with the EU. However, with the emerging issues of how citizens in the countries of trade are being treated, the EU has placed a devoted role in ensuring fair and equality in the third-parties.[23] An example is South Korea. Apart from the Goods Trade Act, the European Commission has integrated aspects of labour rights. Under the negotiations, the European Commission instituted the need to raise concerns regarding the South Korean government regarding work commitments in the FTA. The issues raised included poor growth of labour restructuring needed to provide respectable principles for freedom of association and right of co-operative bargaining from the membership of Korea under the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Additionally, the ratifications of the outstanding rights under the ILO in South Korea by the European Commission focused on establishing a settlement dispute procedure for any employers and employees.[24] Similarly, the aspects of labour rights have been brought forth in the South American nations including Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia.[25] The new FTA provisions entail the enactment of labour laws under the TSD charter where the European Union shall engage in cooperative activities with the member nations.

Concurrently, aspects of environmental conservation and reduced pollution have been introduced in the EU new-FTA.[26] The principle lies in the faction that Conventional on International Trade focuses on conserving flora and fauna of endangered species. With countries such as those from the ASEAN bloc and south-American nations being involved in the trade of exotic animals, the new-FTA ensures that such black market dealings are minimized to protect the wildlife.[27] Demands from the European Union may seem too abrupt for some of the developing countries such as the demand to create cognizance and build volume at the preliminary stages of implementation of the TSD chapter.[28] The sanctions may be too extreme for the developing countries considering that most of the demand for exotic animals come from the European and other developed nations. It would be difficult to ensure that creating awareness and building capacity would do the justice that the European Commission anticipates.

3. Progress in Implementation and Outstanding Issues: Partnership and Cooperation Agreements

The process of entering and qualifying for any new-FTA under the European Commission has integrated aspects of legal ramifications.[29] According to the new Association Committee guidelines, countries including those from south-America and ASEAN countries are required to adhere to the regulations provided under the European Union FTA.[30] To enact the laws, a comprehensive institutional framework for each partnering state is explicitly formulated to ensure that any trade agreement is adhered to including the implementation plans. For instance, aspects of Biotech Market Access and Forest Products which are critically examined under the European Union.[31] Other elements such as the Civil Society Representatives under the Paris Agreement are some of the implementation programs that partnering countries have to commit to reflect appropriately on the EU’s agenda to the Joint Interpretative Instrument (JII).

New Free Trade Agreements: Conclusion of Negotiations

Before any conclusion of a negotiation, the countries involved have to have an internal discussion to present its amended demands and present it to the European Union. These are referred to as the Procedural Meetings that contain the amended claims. Through the European Commission, a thorough analysis of what the orders comprise is detailed and evaluated. The New Free Trade Agreements may not favour the third-parties since the European Union may have the upper hand due to the strength in numbers.[32] Moreover, the force arises from a unified economy that is stronger than any other in the world combined, which can be a problem sometimes as it derails negotiations for more than a period of ten years. For example, Japan’s concluded Free Trade Agreement was incepted on 1^st February 2019. However, aspects of the Investment Negotiations Agreement were not approved by the European Parliament due to the substantive demands that Japan was presenting.[33]

Regarding the conclusion of negotiations, it is paramount to note that bilateral talks between the European Union and third-parties may include a regional bloc such as the ASEAN bloc. The ASEAN bloc comprises of senior pecuniary officials who draft the framework for a future ASEAN-EU regional arrangement and report the same to the Ministerial meeting under Singapore’s chairmanship.[34] The deliberations include more than one country and may not be desirable for the European Union. Nonetheless, due to the principles of Rule of Origin, nations can individually address the negotiation agreements while the main bloc continues demanding for their specific needs.[35] Therefore, as much as efforts are being placed from individual third-party states, no attempts have been recorded from the trading blocs.

To complete the negotiations, final formalities are to be done from both parties. Throughout negotiations, both parties engage under the European Union’s principles of trade and determine which trade agreements are best for each nation.[36] The back and forth process is necessary since, with the new free trade agreement, countries have more flexibility in demanding some form of leniency whereas, the European Union has permission to include new sanctions and implementation process in the trade agreement. Upon agreement in part by the third-party, the European Union through the commission presents the final provisions of the trade agreements and its specific to the European Parliament for deliberations.[37]

When the Council and the European Parliament examine the final deal, they may decide to approve or not approve the trade deal. If the latter occurs, then the third-party representatives have to set up a date on when to reconvene to continue with the deliberations. When Parliament and the Council have approved the trade agreements then, the EU can sign the deal. The Partner can then ratify from their end where the council declares an agreement concluded.[38] However, if many countries under the EU are involved, the states have to sign off on the agreement. Following the signatures by the relevant parties, the European Commission helps the EU put the trade policy in effect through the first publication of the trade policy. Sometimes, the discussions involve the amendment of the existing trade laws.[39] Moreover, when the trade deal is being signed off, a provisional application of trade policy can be in effect which allows the third-parties to continue with the trade.

Legal Effects of the New Free Trade Agreement

1. Human Rights Scope

One of the chief aspects for the European Union under the new-FTA is the pursuance of human rights advocacy in third-party states. The extraterritorial scope for the EU to induce, design and conclude on bilateral trade agreements have introduced aspects of human rights following the EU courts’ judgment on the Front Polisario case.[40] The jurisdictional model under the case has developed the geographical scope for the EU human rights obligations on the context of adopting it under any bilateral agreements. The extraterritorial constructs have been selected from the classical semantic that focuses on control, impact, or functional competence included in the new FTA.[41] As such, instead of just looking at the human rights obligations from the third-countries, the EU has focused on jurisdictional integration of the application of human rights, and it is suggested that the territorial aspects are risky towards the new FTA in the EU.

The question on whether third-party states fall under the juridical territory of human liberties under the EU bilateral commercial treaties is beginning to turn heads. According to the EU charter on human rights, vis-à-vis fundamental human rights, the extraterritorial obligations are existent, and application of the human rights instruments is pivotal to the new EU FTA guidelines.[42] The effects from a legal standpoint are that they can be ineffective in both short-term and long-term aspects. The reason is that, the traditional extraterritorial doctrines that state that any country is sovereign to influence by another including any trade agreement. The EU constitutional values do not transcend to other nations and the proposed balance in human rights under the free trade may be a treaty in writing but, not in action.[43] The political theory on such sanctions is that nations involved in the trade agreements may find it too condescending to introduce human rights aspects that may not work in the country. The democratic legitimacy of the government is based on the normative control exercised by the citizens.[44] Therefore, the people of the nation may not enjoy what is presumed to have been agreed upon by the third-party country with the EU.

1. Trade Impact on Jurisdictional Concept

The EU New FTA is only sanctioned to induce political and socioeconomic impacts. There are no jurisdictional impacts of the trade agreements, which means that countries that have trade treaties with the EU may not favour most of the investment partners they will gain from the relationship. For example, companies from Germany that will be established in South Korea may not enjoy the impunities of operating in a foreign country. The companies have to adhere to the standards and regulations provided by the third-parties.[45] Other instances are the trade agreements in South-American countries. Most of the nations are riddled with jurisdictional judiciary issues about company rights and licences [46] Despite an increase in service and trade export and import from countries such as Paraguay, Cuba, Colombia, and others, there are concerns regarding the ability of the states to sustain the implementation demands from the EU.

1. BREXIT

The recent determination by the United Kingdom to leave the EU is deemed to have severe impacts on the trade agreements between the European Union and the third-parties. The legal basis for roll-over includes the trilateralisation, which is the transformation of additional protocols that will secure the third-parties from any trade agreement losses during the exit. Additionally, the roll-over is seen to affect the existing agreements that occurred when Britain was part of the EU and made trade agreements with the third-parties. The legal ramifications are that the third-parties may not have the leeway to pursue a legal injunction against any trade agreement effects including Agreed tariffs and trade partnerships.[47] Currently, partner countries are being affected when it comes to goods trade, service trade as well as investment from Britain hampering the trade agreements. It has been agreed that an interim agreement stands in honour of the EU’s Commission to the trade agreements already in place. The purpose is to safeguard the third-parties from any arising trade issues.[48] As a result, more than seventy countries are being rolled over due to the trade agreements that existed between them and the UK under the EU trade agreement pact. The lack of precision and clarity on what pertains to benefits for the consumers, investors, and business in the United Kingdom as well as the developing nations.[49] The risk entails that the trade agreements may be damaging to the economies of the countries and no legal precedence can be used to sue or seek legal action against BREXIT in the EU courts.

Conclusion

The process of determination and conclusion of trade agreements between the European Union and the third-countries are meticulous and cautious of how the EU benefits while the third-parties are subject to the demands. The entire paper has presented a succinct description of the initiation process to trade agreements and the principles and guidelines that are used to determine what type of trade agreements are to be signed under the new FTA. Additionally, the paper has presented aspects of continuity and conclusion of the negotiations where different institutions including the European Parliament and Trade Policy Committee are involved in the whole process. There are definite steps in the implementation of the agreement which entails the negotiation on provisions of the new trade agreement. Concurrently, the paper has presented the legal effects of the new FTA under the EU and third-party nations including the famous BREXIT that is now a conundrum in the EU as well as the countries that were in trade agreements with the United Kingdom before the exit. In summary, the trade agreements are beneficial mostly to the European Union and slightly beneficial from a trade and economic aspect for the third-parties.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

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Baker, Jessica, Oriol Carreras, Monique Ebell, Ian Hurst, Simon Kirby, Jack Meaning, Rebecca Piggott, and James Warren. “The Short–Term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU.” National Institute Economic Review 236, no. 1 (2016): 108-120.

Milewicz, Karolina, James Hollway, Claire Peacock, and Duncan Snidal. “Beyond trade: the expanding scope of the nontrade agenda in trade agreements.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 4 (2018): 743-773.

Park, Sunghoon. “The new politics of trade negotiations: the case of the EU-Korea FTA.” Journal of European Integration39, no. 7 (2017): 827-841.

Meyer, Timothy. “Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade.” Vand. L. Rev. 70 (2017): 985.

Bull, Reeve T., Neysun A. Mahboubi, Richard B. Stewart, and Jonathan B. Wiener. “New approaches to international regulatory cooperation: the challenge of TTIP, TPP, and mega-regional trade agreements.” Law & Contemp. Probs. 78 (2015): 1.

Whitman, Richard G. “The UK and EU foreign, security and defence policy after Brexit: integrated, associated or detached?.” National Institute Economic Review 238, no. 1 (2016): R43-R50.

Bown, Chad P. “Mega‐Regional Trade Agreements and the Future of the WTO.” Global Policy 8, no. 1 (2017): 107-112.

[1] Laursen, Finn, and Christilla Roederer-Rynning. “Introduction: the new EU FTAs as contentious market regulation.” Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 763-779.

 

[2] Baker, Jessica, Oriol Carreras, Monique Ebell, Ian Hurst, Simon Kirby, Jack Meaning, Rebecca Piggott, and James Warren. “The Short–Term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU.” National Institute Economic Review 236, no. 1 (2016): 108-120.

 

[3] Baker, Jessica, Oriol Carreras, Monique Ebell, Ian Hurst, Simon Kirby, Jack Meaning, Rebecca Piggott, and James Warren. “The Short–Term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU.” National Institute Economic Review 236, no. 1 (2016): 108-120.

 

[4] Laursen, Finn, and Christilla Roederer-Rynning. “Introduction: the new EU FTAs as contentious market regulation.” Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 763-779.

 

[5] Milewicz, Karolina, James Hollway, Claire Peacock, and Duncan Snidal. “Beyond trade: the expanding scope of the nontrade agenda in trade agreements.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 4 (2018): 743-773.

 

[6] Baker, Jessica, Oriol Carreras, Monique Ebell, Ian Hurst, Simon Kirby, Jack Meaning, Rebecca Piggott, and James Warren. “The Short–Term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU.” National Institute Economic Review 236, no. 1 (2016): 108-120.

 

[7] Milewicz, Karolina, James Hollway, Claire Peacock, and Duncan Snidal. “Beyond trade: the expanding scope of the nontrade agenda in trade agreements.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 4 (2018): 743-773.

 

[8] Baker, Jessica, Oriol Carreras, Monique Ebell, Ian Hurst, Simon Kirby, Jack Meaning, Rebecca Piggott, and James Warren. “The Short–Term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU.” National Institute Economic Review 236, no. 1 (2016): 108-120.

 

[9] Milewicz, Karolina, James Hollway, Claire Peacock, and Duncan Snidal. “Beyond trade: the expanding scope of the nontrade agenda in trade agreements.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 4 (2018): 743-773.

 

[10] Baker, Jessica, Oriol Carreras, Monique Ebell, Ian Hurst, Simon Kirby, Jack Meaning, Rebecca Piggott, and James Warren. “The Short–Term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU.” National Institute Economic Review 236, no. 1 (2016): 108-120.

 

[11] Laursen, Finn, and Christilla Roederer-Rynning. “Introduction: the new EU FTAs as contentious market regulation.” Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 763-779.

 

[12] Milewicz, Karolina, James Hollway, Claire Peacock, and Duncan Snidal. “Beyond trade: the expanding scope of the nontrade agenda in trade agreements.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 4 (2018): 743-773.

 

[13] Bown, Chad P. “Mega‐Regional Trade Agreements and the Future of the WTO.” Global Policy 8, no. 1 (2017): 107-112.

[14] Baker, Jessica, Oriol Carreras, Monique Ebell, Ian Hurst, Simon Kirby, Jack Meaning, Rebecca Piggott, and James Warren. “The Short–Term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU.” National Institute Economic Review 236, no. 1 (2016): 108-120.

 

[15] Meyer, Timothy. “Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade.” Vand. L. Rev. 70 (2017): 985.

 

[16] Milewicz, Karolina, James Hollway, Claire Peacock, and Duncan Snidal. “Beyond trade: the expanding scope of the nontrade agenda in trade agreements.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 4 (2018): 743-773.

 

[17] Baker, Jessica, Oriol Carreras, Monique Ebell, Ian Hurst, Simon Kirby, Jack Meaning, Rebecca Piggott, and James Warren. “The Short–Term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU.” National Institute Economic Review 236, no. 1 (2016): 108-120.

 

[18] Meyer, Timothy. “Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade.” Vand. L. Rev. 70 (2017): 985.

 

[19] Milewicz, Karolina, James Hollway, Claire Peacock, and Duncan Snidal. “Beyond trade: the expanding scope of the nontrade agenda in trade agreements.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 4 (2018): 743-773.

 

[20] Laursen, Finn, and Christilla Roederer-Rynning. “Introduction: the new EU FTAs as contentious market regulation.” Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 763-779.

 

[21] Baker, Jessica, Oriol Carreras, Monique Ebell, Ian Hurst, Simon Kirby, Jack Meaning, Rebecca Piggott, and James Warren. “The Short–Term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU.” National Institute Economic Review 236, no. 1 (2016): 108-120.

 

[22] Meyer, Timothy. “Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade.” Vand. L. Rev. 70 (2017): 985.

 

[23] Milewicz, Karolina, James Hollway, Claire Peacock, and Duncan Snidal. “Beyond trade: the expanding scope of the nontrade agenda in trade agreements.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 4 (2018): 743-773.

 

[24] Laursen, Finn, and Christilla Roederer-Rynning. “Introduction: the new EU FTAs as contentious market regulation.” Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 763-779.

 

[25] Meyer, Timothy. “Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade.” Vand. L. Rev. 70 (2017): 985.

 

[26] Park, Sunghoon. “The new politics of trade negotiations: the case of the EU-Korea FTA.” Journal of European Integration39, no. 7 (2017): 827-841.

 

[27] Whitman, Richard G. “The UK and EU foreign, security and defence policy after Brexit: integrated, associated or detached?.” National Institute Economic Review 238, no. 1 (2016): R43-R50.

 

[28] Milewicz, Karolina, James Hollway, Claire Peacock, and Duncan Snidal. “Beyond trade: the expanding scope of the nontrade agenda in trade agreements.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 4 (2018): 743-773.

 

[29] Bown, Chad P. “Mega‐Regional Trade Agreements and the Future of the WTO.” Global Policy 8, no. 1 (2017): 107-112.

 

[30] Laursen, Finn, and Christilla Roederer-Rynning. “Introduction: the new EU FTAs as contentious market regulation.” Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 763-779.

 

[31] Milewicz, Karolina, James Hollway, Claire Peacock, and Duncan Snidal. “Beyond trade: the expanding scope of the nontrade agenda in trade agreements.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 4 (2018): 743-773.

 

[32] Park, Sunghoon. “The new politics of trade negotiations: the case of the EU-Korea FTA.” Journal of European Integration39, no. 7 (2017): 827-841.

 

[33] Bull, Reeve T., Neysun A. Mahboubi, Richard B. Stewart, and Jonathan B. Wiener. “New approaches to international regulatory cooperation: the challenge of TTIP, TPP, and mega-regional trade agreements.” Law & Contemp. Probs. 78 (2015): 1.

 

[34] Whitman, Richard G. “The UK and EU foreign, security and defence policy after Brexit: integrated, associated or detached?.” National Institute Economic Review 238, no. 1 (2016): R43-R50.

 

[35] Baker, Jessica, Oriol Carreras, Monique Ebell, Ian Hurst, Simon Kirby, Jack Meaning, Rebecca Piggott, and James Warren. “The Short–Term Economic Impact of Leaving the EU.” National Institute Economic Review 236, no. 1 (2016): 108-120.

 

[36] Park, Sunghoon. “The new politics of trade negotiations: the case of the EU-Korea FTA.” Journal of European Integration39, no. 7 (2017): 827-841.

 

[37] Laursen, Finn, and Christilla Roederer-Rynning. “Introduction: the new EU FTAs as contentious market regulation.” Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 763-779.

 

[38] Bull, Reeve T., Neysun A. Mahboubi, Richard B. Stewart, and Jonathan B. Wiener. “New approaches to international regulatory cooperation: the challenge of TTIP, TPP, and mega-regional trade agreements.” Law & Contemp. Probs. 78 (2015): 1.

 

[39] Park, Sunghoon. “The new politics of trade negotiations: the case of the EU-Korea FTA.” Journal of European Integration39, no. 7 (2017): 827-841.

 

[40] Whitman, Richard G. “The UK and EU foreign, security and defence policy after Brexit: integrated, associated or detached?.” National Institute Economic Review 238, no. 1 (2016): R43-R50.

 

[41] Meyer, Timothy. “Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade.” Vand. L. Rev. 70 (2017): 985.

 

[42] Laursen, Finn, and Christilla Roederer-Rynning. “Introduction: the new EU FTAs as contentious market regulation.” Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 763-779.

 

[43] Park, Sunghoon. “The new politics of trade negotiations: the case of the EU-Korea FTA.” Journal of European Integration39, no. 7 (2017): 827-841.

 

[44] Whitman, Richard G. “The UK and EU foreign, security and defence policy after Brexit: integrated, associated or detached?.” National Institute Economic Review 238, no. 1 (2016): R43-R50.

[45] Meyer, Timothy. “Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade.” Vand. L. Rev. 70 (2017): 985.

 

[46] Laursen, Finn, and Christilla Roederer-Rynning. “Introduction: the new EU FTAs as contentious market regulation.” Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 763-779.

 

[47] Park, Sunghoon. “The new politics of trade negotiations: the case of the EU-Korea FTA.” Journal of European Integration39, no. 7 (2017): 827-841.

 

[48] Laursen, Finn, and Christilla Roederer-Rynning. “Introduction: the new EU FTAs as contentious market regulation.” Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 763-779.

 

[49] Whitman, Richard G. “The UK and EU foreign, security and defence policy after Brexit: integrated, associated or detached?.” National Institute Economic Review 238, no. 1 (2016): R43-R50.